This paper provides an impact evaluation of the Programa Nacional de Crédito Fundiário, a market assisted land reform program in Brazil. The paper uses a panel dataset and a pipeline control group to evaluate the program's impact on agricultural production and earned income, using both difference in differences and individual fixed effects models. The heterogeneous effect of additional years of land ownership is investigated. The findings suggest that the program increases agricultural production by over 100% and earned income by 35%, but only after four years of land ownership. The conclusions are supported by a number of robustness tests, including the use of attrition weights. The benefits of the program, however, largely go to making debt payments rather than to raising current income. If the program's impact on income continues grow, as it did in the first five years, improvements in net wealth and current welfare could both be achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the 21 st century, the rural areas of developing countries were home to nearly 900 million people living on less than one dollar per day, and over two billion people living on less than two dollars per day (World Bank, 2007) . Households are more likely to be chronically poor when they have low levels of assets (Bird et al., 2002; Carter and Barrett, 2006) .
Policies that facilitate access to land-one of the most important assets in rural areas-may be able to assist poor rural households to develop and eventually sustain a non-poor standard of living. While important, land acquisition by itself is often insufficient to eradicate poverty; supporting infrastructure, access to credit, technology, and markets are also essential in order to elevate asset returns (Deininger, 1999) . One program that provides beneficiaries with subsidized loans to purchase land from willing sellers, as well as assistance with complementary investments, is the Brazilian National Land Credit Program (Programa Nacional de Crédito Fundiário, PNCF). Between 2002 and 2012, the PNCF assisted over 90,000 beneficiaries to acquire land. This paper provides an impact evaluation of this program.
There are few impact evaluations of land transfer programs, and the debate surrounding their effectiveness has been highly politicized (Deere and Medeiros, 2007) . In an evaluation of South Africa's Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development program, Keswell and Carter (2014) provide one of the most credible studies. They conclude that living standards initially decrease with land transfers, but after three years of land ownership, living standards increase by fifty percent. We seek to contribute to this debate by providing evidence from a similar program in a different part of the world. Because we utilize panel data to evaluate this program, in contrast to the single cross-section used for the South Africa study, fewer assumptions are required to address potential concerns caused by the unobservable characteristics of the participants.
This paper evaluates the Rural Poverty Alleviation line (CPR) of the PNCF on the outcome variables of agricultural production and earned income, using both difference in differences and individual fixed effects models. Because beneficiaries acquired land at different times, the heterogeneous effect of additional years of land ownership is investigated. The paper uses a panel dataset from 2006 and 2010 of beneficiaries randomly selected from program participants and a control group randomly selected from the program's pipeline. Because both treatment and control groups applied to the program, and were verified to be eligible, the use of a pipeline control group helps to reduce concerns over unobservable differences between the two groups. Concerns related to the influence of unobservables are further tested by the inclusion of a proxy for the "eagerness" of groups in applying to the program (Agüero et al., 2009) . Finally, the use of a fixed effects model removes unobservable individual characteristics that are time invariant. While panel data has many advantages, there was also considerable attrition in this panel. Multiple tests provide mixed evidence on whether or not attrition was random. Given the possibility of non-random attrition, the models were re-estimated with weights to correct for attrition. The results of the paper were only strengthened. A difference in differences model was also estimated with the inclusion of individuals who were interviewed only in 2010 as replacements for the attritors. The paper's conclusions were confirmed.
The paper finds that the Brazilian National Land Credit Program has a significant impact on the outcome variables of program participants. Yet the benefits of land ownership only start to appear after a certain amount of time. While there is no statistically significant impact on agricultural production or earned income in the first three years of land ownership, a positive impact begins to emerge in the 4 th year, and after 5-6 years of program participation production and income rise by over 100 percent and 35 percent respectively. These are important gains for households living at around US$2 per day, most of whom qualify for the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer program in Brazil. Because the PNCF program requires the repayment of the loan, however, a more complete evaluation of its effectiveness in reducing rural poverty must take the burden of the debt into consideration. When this is done, the results suggest that the benefits of the program largely go to making debt payments and improving the net worth of the beneficiary households rather than to raising current household expenditures. If the beneficiaries' income continues to grow at the rate observed in the first five to six years of land ownership, it is likely that they will soon reach a level at which they can simultaneously meet their debt obligations and raise their standard of living.
In Section II of the paper, background information on the program and dataset are provided. The methodology is described in Section III and descriptive statistics are presented in Section IV. Section V contains a discussion of the main econometric results. Section VI provides a battery of robustness checks, including an analysis of attrition, and offers some evidence on the heterogeneity of impacts by farm size. Section VII analyzes beneficiaries' ability to repay the PNCF loan, and Section VIII offers conclusions. The PNCF aims to promote access to land and to provide infrastructure on the acquired lands. There are a series of eligibility requirements for enrollment, including earning less than R$9,000 (US$5,049) per year, having assets totaling no more than R$15,000 (US$8,415), not owning enough land to sustain a family, and having at least five years of experience as a farmer.
II. BACKGROUND AND DATA
2 Individuals apply to this line of the program by forming an association with other interested individuals. Once all of the eligibility requirements are verified, the eligibility of the land intended for purchase is checked. The most important criteria with respect to the property are that it not be eligible for expropriation through state led land reform, and that the property's price be similar to those of other properties in the same region, using the Ministry of Agrarian Development's Land Market Monitoring System as a guide.
After ensuring that both the association and the land meet the eligibility requirements, a productive project for the land is analyzed and the loan is approved or rejected. The maximum amount of the loan per beneficiary was R$40,000 (US$22,440) in 2009, however, each region of the country had different caps associated with local market prices. In the Northeast, the average loan size was about half of the maximum. In addition to 14-17 year loans made for the purchase of land, the program makes infrastructure grants available to the association, which can be used to build houses and community infrastructure, or to purchase capital for agricultural production.
In an effort to create an incentive for the land price to be negotiated as low as possible, the R$40,000 cap applies to the sum of the grant and loan. Thus, the smaller the loan component, the larger is the grant component. After the acquisition of the land, technical assistance is provided.
In 2012, the Ministry of Agrarian Development released a report in Portuguese of an impact evaluation of the PNCF (Sparovek, 2012) . That evaluation used a similar dataset as this paper, but a different methodology throughout. The authors used Propensity Score Matching
1 The other line of the PNCF is the Consolidation of Family Farming (CAF), which has a higher income cap for eligibility than the CPR. Another important difference is that CAF makes individual loans, while CPR makes group loans. CAF has been more important in other regions of the country. together with a Difference in Differences approach. Unlike the results presented here, they found no impact on monthly monetary income or gross agricultural production. The differing results the reader will find below are most likely due to the fact that they did not distinguish the heterogeneous effect of additional years of land ownership, nor did they systematically account for the changing number of family members over the two waves of the survey. Differences in the datasets used could also matter. Our sample has thirty-nine percent more observations, largely because we do not exclude the non-beneficiaries who became beneficiaries between the two waves of the panel.
The dataset used in this impact evaluation is a two period panel, collected in 2006 and 2010. We were involved in the creation of the questionnaires used in both periods, in addition to the data collection process in the second period. The data were thoroughly cleaned to ensure that no observations were wasted. 3 The treatment group of this dataset was randomly selected from members of beneficiary associations through stratified random sampling, by municipality, association and member. We call these beneficiaries (B). The control group was drawn from members of associations in the program pipeline-those that were enrolled in the program, were deemed eligible as program participants, but had not yet acquired their land. These pipeline nonbeneficiaries (PNB) were selected from the same or neighboring municipalities as the randomly selected projects of beneficiaries. As will be explained below, many pipeline non-beneficiaries acquired land between the baseline and follow-up periods, and thus transitioned into the treatment group. This was a natural result of the continued growth of the program.
In the baseline period, the reference period for beneficiaries was the twelve months prior to the acquisition of land, which changed from project to project. In order to minimize potential measurement error due to recall, the universe of projects that was used to sample from was restricted to those projects that had been created in the thirteen months prior to the fieldwork in 2006. For the pipeline non-beneficiaries in both the baseline and the follow-up, and for the beneficiaries in the follow-up, the reference period was the twelve months prior to the interview.
The original sample had 1335 individual members; of these, about forty-two percent attrited. In order to take advantage of the panel nature of the data, the main analysis in this paper uses a sample of 773 individual members that were interviewed in both periods. Attrition is subsequently dealt with in detail in the section on robustness checks. When weighted regressions are estimated to correct for attrition bias, the main results in the paper are only strengthened.
Similarly, when a robustness check is conducted using a repeated cross-section that includes replacements in the follow-up period for those individuals that attrited after the first wave of the survey, the results confirm the main findings from the panel analysis. The number of people in member households was found to be decreasing between the baseline and the follow-up period. In the baseline period, both pipeline non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries had between 4.7 and 4.8 people per household, respectively. In the follow-up period, the pipeline non-beneficiaries had 4.5 people per household while the beneficiaries had 3.9. Because of these changes, we use outcome variables measured in household per capita (HHPC) units. The outcome variables that were analyzed were earned income and agricultural production, which will be defined in detail in Section IV. In all cases, the income and production variables were deflated to Reais of January of 2010. Figure 1 , below, displays mean agricultural production and earned income, in HHPC units, by period, status and number of years of land ownership (LO in Figure 1 ). This simple analysis of means displays an important pattern that this paper addresses: the positive-or U-shaped-relationship between the value of outcome variables and the number of years of land ownership.
III. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
Two models are estimated: Difference-in-Differences (with the fixed effects at the level of the group) and individual Fixed Effects (with the fixed effects at the level of the individual enrolled member). Using these models, we additionally incorporate an analysis allowing for the heterogeneity from additional years of land ownership. While the individual FE model is superior, we estimate the DD model for comparison, and because a number of robustness checks can only be estimated in this framework. The methodology used to address attrition is described in Section VI of the paper.
When attempting to evaluate the impact of a program, an important problem to address is selection bias. If a program is not randomly assigned, one can assume that individuals who are more eager, able or otherwise more likely to benefit from a program will apply. A possible income increase following participation in the program might then be attributable, at least in part, to the attributes of the applicants, as opposed to the effectiveness of the program. We employ three different strategies in an effort to avoid this bias and arrive at the causal impact of the program.
First, by using a pipeline control group (Ravallion, 2008) , application to the program and verified eligibility of the group are held constant across treatment and control groups. In principle, any unobserved characteristics that motivate people to apply to the program are held constant across both groups, thereby reducing selection bias. In addition, since the program depends on individuals forming groups in order to acquire the loan for land purchase, it is likely that variation of unobservables across individuals within each group will increase the degree of randomness of the treatment. There still might be a concern that some unobserved characteristics of individuals could influence the timing of application or, given application, could influence whether or not they succeed in acquiring land. As shown below, there is suggestive evidence that receiving land after enrolling in the program appears to be random. Thus, unobserved characteristics do not appear to influence the timing of the acquisition of land. In the robustness checks section, we also include a proxy for the eagerness of beneficiaries, to assess whether early applicants to the program were perhaps more motivated for success. The analysis serves as additional evidence that it is, in fact, land acquisition and not unobserved characteristics of enrolled members that are driving the results.
Second, a Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation technique is used in order to remove any time-invariant differences between the treatment and control groups, and also to eliminate time-trends that are common to both groups. The DD technique has been useful in estimating the causal impact of policy interventions in numerous studies by modeling the fixed effects at the level of the group. The approach entails estimating the equation:
where Y is either agricultural production or earned income, T is an indicator variable that equals one in the follow-up period, S is an indicator variable that equals one if the enrolled member has acquired land, T*S is an indicator variable that equals one if both T is equal to one and S is equal to one, and X is a vector of control variables. In addition, i, s and t index individuals, status of treatment (beneficiary or pipeline non-beneficiary) and time (baseline or follow-up period). The estimate of the effect of acquiring land via the PNCF, then, is π. In order to avoid possible bias, potentially endogenous time varying controls are kept at baseline levels. The DD identification strategy relies on E(ε ist |S s , T t , X ist )=0. In other words, there can be no omitted factors that are causing both the growth in the outcome variable and the treatment status.
Third, another way of dealing with the issue of selection bias is to difference out individual level unobserved characteristics that are fixed through time by using a fixed effects (FE) model. The error term ε it can be decomposed into time-invariant (u i ) and time-varying (η it )
components. Thus we have:
Y it = α t + πL it +δX it +u i +η it (2) where η is normally distributed, and L is an indicator variable that equals one if the enrolled member received land before the follow-up period. If we lag this equation by one period and take the difference between the two, we have:
In this way, the time invariant unobservable characteristics at the individual level are differenced out (Wooldridge, 2002) . Using an individual fixed effects model should result in a more accurate estimate of the causal impact of treatment because assignment into treatment is more likely to be random given the removal of time invariant unobserved individual characteristics in conjunction with the use of the pipeline control group and the group nature of the program design. For these reasons, the FE model is the preferred specification utilized in this paper.
In the techniques mentioned so far, treatment is modeled with a binary variable. The implicit assumption is that the average impact of treatment is the same for all beneficiaries of the program. However, as mentioned in the previous section, different associations obtained land at different times. One can suppose that the intensity of treatment increases with the amount of time a member is exposed to treatment, thus leading to a greater impact (King and Behrman, 2009 In the same way that there might be heterogeneity of impacts due to duration of exposure to land ownership, heterogeneity could exist for other reasons as well. Section VI of the paper explores the differential impact of treatment due to the "eagerness" of the beneficiaries-how early they applied to the program-and the size of the land that beneficiaries acquired. In both cases, we interact a dummy variable (for eagerness, or farm size) with the coefficients of interest.
In the case of the intensity of treatment DD model and farm size, for example, equation (4) becomes: (6) Where D i is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all beneficiaries with acquired land larger than the median farm size of beneficiaries, and 0 for all other individuals. The interaction of the farm size dummy with the intensity of treatment land ownership dummies allows us to test for any differential impact of the duration of land ownership by farm size.
The standard errors for the regression coefficients throughout the paper are calculated with corrections for clustering to allow for the possibility of heteroskedasticity across projects or correlation of errors across time within a geographical location. The errors were clustered at the level of the project for beneficiaries and many pipeline non-beneficiaries, and at the level of the municipality for pipeline non-beneficiaries when the project code-that could uniquely identify an association-was missing. There were a total of 200 clusters.
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IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VALIDITY OF THE PIPELINE
The outcome variable agricultural production was defined as the total value of agricultural output (including animal production), whether sold, stocked, exchanged or consumed. As can be observed in Table 1 , beneficiaries had less agricultural production than pipeline non-beneficiaries in the baseline period, significant at the five percent level. In the follow-up period, beneficiaries that had owned land for four or more years had substantially more agricultural production than the pipeline non-beneficiaries. Thus, their productive opportunities appear to have increased as a result of land ownership. Earned income, the second outcome variable, was defined as the value of net agricultural production-total agricultural production minus variable costs-plus income earned in the labor market and from selfemployment activities. There is no statistical difference between the average earned income of pipeline non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries in either period, regardless of the length of land ownership. There is, however, a statistically significant difference between the income of beneficiaries with land ownership for three years or less and those with 5 years or more, suggesting that after an initial dip income grew gradually over time.
Control variables were included in the estimation to capture differences in the outcome variable that were due to baseline characteristics of the enrolled members as opposed to the acquisition of land via the PNCF. Basic demographic and location variables were used (age, sex, race, marital status and urban status), in addition to education and experience (years of schooling and years of experience as a farmer). As can be seen in Table 2 , among these individual characteristics, beneficiaries statistically differ from the pipeline non-beneficiaries only in sex composition and urban status-the beneficiary group being more male and less urban than the pipeline non-beneficiary group.
Measures of baseline social capital in the association were used in an attempt to capture the effects of social capital on the outcome variable. More socially cohesive associations will likely be predictive of both participation in the program and the success of the eventual projects.
The first social capital variable, position held, is an indicator variable that equals one if the member held a position in the leadership of the association. While the beneficiaries held more positions in their associations than the pipeline non-beneficiaries, the other social capital variables display the opposite pattern. Beneficiaries had fewer meetings and less trust in other association members. Frequency of meetings shows how frequently association members met, while trust is a variable that indicates the amount of trust that the enrolled member had in other association members. Since there was less social cohesiveness in the beneficiary group, it is unlikely that these variables explain their success.
Agricultural variables were also included since they may influence both treatment status and the outcome variables. Technical assistance and PRONAF are variables that indicate whether enrolled members received technical assistance and whether they received additional loans from a credit program for family farmers. While technical assistance is statistically equivalent for both groups, pipeline non-beneficiaries did receive more family farming loans, which is consistent with their higher levels of agricultural production in the baseline. The regional agricultural variables included are yield of corn and daily agricultural wage. State level corn yields (tons/hectare) proxy for time varying geo-climatic characteristics. 6 Pipeline nonbeneficiaries found themselves in areas with more favorable geo-climatic conditions; this is, once again, consistent with their higher levels of agricultural production in the baseline period.
Pipeline non-beneficiaries also lived in areas that had higher agricultural wages in the baseline.
When using a pipeline control group, there should not be any unobserved characteristics that influence which enrolled members receive treatment after application (Ravallion, 2008; Angrist, 1998) . While this is impossible to prove, a few basic tests serve as evidence that receiving land after applying for the PNCF loan appears to be random. First, a comparison of means indicated that there is no statistically significant difference in the baseline between the outcome variables of pipeline non-beneficiaries that go on to acquire land and those nonbeneficiaries that remain in the pipeline in the follow-up period (see Appendix Table A1 ). While there are differences in the observable covariates, these are controlled for in the main analysis.
Second, probit regressions were run seeking to predict which pipeline non-beneficiaries go on to acquire land between the baseline and the follow-up periods. The results are reported in Table 3, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the member acquired land sometime between the baseline and follow-up period. Earned income and agricultural production-which reflect the influence of observable and unobservable variables-fail to significantly predict the movement into the treatment group, regardless of the inclusion of control variables. 7 Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that the timing of treatment was random at the level of the individual member because treatment occurred at the level of the association.
As such, these tests provide suggestive evidence that unobserved characteristics of pipeline nonbeneficiaries are not influencing which ones go on to receive land.
V. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
This section presents the results for the different specifications used. Outliers for each outcome variable were excluded from their respective regressions and were detected by plotting the residuals against the fitted values from the regressions. 8 The panel on the left of Tables 4 and   5 show the results for the difference in differences estimation. Time and status dummies, along 7 The estimation in Table 3 is done with baseline values only and the sample is limited to the balanced panel of pipeline non-beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who became beneficiaries after the baseline period. A separate estimation was run including attritors, and the results are equivalent. 8 In the case of agricultural production, ten outliers were detected. In the case of earned income, nine of those ten were also outliers, plus an additional four for a total of thirteen. In addition, four individual members were dropped due to missing observations. For agricultural production, then, the total number of observations is 1522 and for earned income the number is 1516. Table 4 are statistically significant at the five percent level.
The bottom left panel of Table 4 displays the results for agricultural production using the intensity of treatment estimation. It shows the effects of the program for increasing number of years of land ownership. The pattern is clear: increasing years of land ownership increase the magnitude of the estimates. The coefficients on being a landowner for three years or less are all positive, but none are statistically significant. The coefficients on being a landowner for four years are all positive and significant at ten percent. Finally, the coefficients on being a landowner for five to six years are all of a much larger magnitude than the coefficients for the previous two categories and all become significant at the one percent level. The preferred specification in column four indicates that owning land via the PNCF for five to six years increases per capita agricultural production in the last year by R$583 (US$327). Given the limitations of the data, we cannot know for certain if the returns will continue to increase at an increasing or decreasing rate, or at what point they might plateau, with additional years of land ownership. Nevertheless, the results in Table 4 suggest that acquiring land via the PNCF will likely have an increasing effect on agricultural production over time.
The results for the binary individual FE model in the top right panel of Table 4 show almost identical effects as the difference in differences model. The binary case shows significant and positive effects on agricultural production of being a beneficiary of the program. The coefficient is robust to the alternative specification with time varying controls. In the intensity of treatment estimation in the bottom right panel, the expected pattern is observed. Increasing years of land ownership are associated with increased magnitudes of the effects on agricultural production. The coefficients are significant for landowners for four years and for landowners for five to six years. From the preferred specification in column six, it can be concluded that being a beneficiary of the PNCF for five to six years increases agricultural production per person in the household by an average of R$750 (US$421) in the last year. This result is significant at the one percent level.
For the outcome variable earned income (Table 5) , all binary models show a positive effect of being a beneficiary of the program, although none of the coefficients are statistically significant. The estimation results that allow for the heterogeneous effects of additional years of land ownership are shown in the lower panels of Table 5 . In both the DD and individual FE models, the impact of the PNCF only becomes positive and significant at five percent for beneficiaries with five or six years of land ownership (with the exception of column four). Based on the preferred FE specification in column six, the estimated impact of the PNCF on earned income is R$501 (US$281) per person in 2010, significant at five percent.
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND HETEROGENEITY
In order to ensure that the estimates presented are robust to alternative specifications and that a causal interpretation is appropriate, a variety of robustness checks were performed. First, in order to investigate whether some unobserved trend could be causing spurious findings, a placebo test was run. Second, it is possible that unobserved characteristics of the earliest beneficiaries were causing their agricultural production and earned income to grow more. In order to control for this, an eagerness variable was included in the DD estimation. Third, sample attrition and potential attrition bias was analyzed. Fourth, rather than use the panel of individuals who were observed in both periods, the DD model was estimated with the cross-sectional data from each year, thereby including both the individuals who would attrit after 2006 and their replacements in 2010. Finally, the heterogeneity of impacts by size of land acquisition was explored.
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Despite the apparent validity of using the pipeline control (Table 3) , it is possible that the beneficiaries were subject to different trends than the pipeline non-beneficiaries. The estimated parameters, then, could be reflecting these different unobserved trends, instead of accurately estimating the impact of the program. In order to provide suggestive evidence that the identification strategy is indeed valid, a placebo test was run. This placebo test entails estimating the regressions above on a variable that the PNCF should not have any effect on. If there were unobserved trends affecting the beneficiaries and not the pipeline non-beneficiaries, then the results could display a similar pattern to those in Table 4 and 5. The test was conducted with the outcome variable total transfers, which include old age pensions, Bolsa Família conditional cash transfers, other government transfers and private transfers. There is no reason to expect that access to land via the PNCF should affect this variable. As can be seen in Table 6 , no significant effects are observed on total transfers in either the binary or intensity of treatment cases in the FE model. In the DD estimation, there is a single coefficient that is marginally significant at the 10% level, but the pattern of increasing impacts with years of land ownership is not observed.
Overall, the results provide evidence that it is unlikely that the beneficiaries and pipeline nonbeneficiaries were exposed to different group-specific time trends.
In addition to the placebo test, another model was estimated to address the concern that there may be differences within the beneficiary group itself. It could be that the earliest The eagerness variable was defined in two steps. First, the number of days of eagerness was calculated as the median contract date of all projects prior to 2010 in the beneficiary's micro-region minus the beneficiary's contract date. 10 Thus, eagerness was defined in a local context. The larger the value of this variable, the more eager was the beneficiary in applying to the program. The eagerness variable was included in the regression in levels to proxy for time invariant characteristics that might be positively correlated with more favorable outcomes.
Second, an indicator variable for eagerness was created. This defined beneficiaries as eager if the eagerness variable was above the median value for all beneficiaries in our sample, and not eager otherwise. Thus, half of the beneficiaries were classified as eager. The eagerness indicator variable was interacted with the different levels of the number of years of land ownership to assess the differential impact of applying early to the program as compared to those who applied late.
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The results are presented in Table 7 . For the outcome variable agricultural production, the same pattern as the main regressions is observed; beneficiaries have increased agricultural production with increasing years of land ownership. Interestingly, though, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant, suggesting that there was no differential performance for the eager. If anything, contrary to our expectations, the effect of eagerness was negative for the beneficiaries with four or more years of land ownership (although not statistically significant). Thus, the results indicate that the pattern of increasing agricultural production with increasing number of years of land ownership is not due to some unobserved eagerness of the beneficiaries who acquired their land first. The same conclusion can be reached for the earned income outcome variable. The results in column eight of Table 7 are quite similar to what was observed in column eight of Table 5 . While there is some evidence that income rises with the duration of land ownership, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the differential impact of eagerness is always insignificant, and more often negative than positive. We conclude that the unobserved eagerness of beneficiaries is not the reason why agricultural production or earned income increase with the number of years of land ownership.
The eagerness dummy helps to address a related concern. It is possible that-by acquiring land early-the eager beneficiaries were able to purchase superior quality land. If this were the case, eagerness would proxy for unobserved characteristics of the land rather than of the beneficiaries. But since the eager beneficiaries do not have superior outcomes, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that they were able to purchase better land.
Attrition
In the follow-up phase of the data collection process, thirty six percent of the original beneficiaries, and forty seven percent of the original pipeline non-beneficiaries were not interviewed again. An important reason for such high attrition rates was that the 2010 field work was carried out with a tighter budget than in 2006. As a result, the enumerators were not able to make numerous attempts to locate individuals and were not able to track down individuals who did not live nearby. As reported by one of the authors of this paper, who worked as an enumerator in 2010, the most common reason why individuals were not re-interviewed was that they were simply not found. This occurred either because the individual was not present when the association was visited, or because an entire association or project could not be located. If a single individual was not found, the enumerators were instructed to interview a replacement beneficiary or pipeline non-beneficiary from the same association. In the case of an entire pipeline non-beneficiary association that was missing, enumerators were instructed to interview a pre-determined association nearby that had not been interviewed in 2006. Other reasons for attrition included withdrawal from the program, refusing the interview, death and coding errors.
In addition to the individuals who were not re-interviewed in 2010, there were 162 pipeline nonbeneficiaries that acquired land after the baseline period and were re-interviewed as beneficiaries. As such, they exited from the pipeline non-beneficiary sample, potentially leaving it unrepresentative of how it was constituted in the baseline.
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Attrition can be a serious threat to inference using panel data because it can cause the original random sample to become unrepresentative of the treatment and control groups as individuals exit from the panel over time. This can lead to biased parameter estimates of the impact of treatment. These potential biases, however, depend not on the magnitude of attrition but on whether the attrition was non-random. Specifically, if there was systematic selection on characteristics of the enrolled members even after conditioning on observed covariates, bias could ensue. In this section, a number of tests indicate that attrition was random in this dataset, while others suggest that it was not. In order to control for the potential bias resulting from nonrandom attrition, the inverse probabilities of retention (i.e., non-attrition) are used as weights (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1998) .
A number of steps were taken in order to analyze whether there was any pattern to the attrition in the data. The first test conducted was a simple comparison of base year means, and a Student's t-test of the differences between those enrolled members that disappeared and those that remained (Alderman et al. 2001 ). Because we suspected that there may be heterogeneous patterns to attrition, all comparisons and tests were done first for the full sample, and then separately for the beneficiary and pipeline non-beneficiary samples. Table 8 summarizes the findings of the mean comparison by group. Looking at the case of the full sample, attritors seemed to be younger, more white, less married, had more schooling, less experience as farmers and were more urban. They had less trust in other members of their association than nonattritors, and lived in areas where there was a lower daily wage. While there are many significant differences in observable variables, there was no evidence that attritors had systematically different outcome variables at baseline within the full sample or the beneficiary group.
Nevertheless, it appears that the weakest of the pipeline non-beneficiaries, in terms of agricultural production, were attriting at the one percent level of significance. In other words, pipeline non-beneficiaries with lower levels of agricultural production were more likely to disappear from the sample after the baseline period. This would result in a pipeline nonbeneficiary group that appeared stronger than it would have, had the attritors remained in the sample. This pattern of attrition would lead to a downward bias on the estimated coefficients of program impact. Because the comparison of mean group characteristics shows significant differences for many variables, nonrandom attrition is suspected.
Following Alderman et al. (2001) and Chawanote and Barrett (2014) , we next implemented a BGLW test (Becketti, Gould, Lillard, and Welch, 1988) by estimating the following equation with the sample of attritors and non-attritors using baseline data only:
where A is an indicator variable that equals one if the enrolled member attrited between the baseline and follow-up periods, Y are the outcome variables agricultural production and earned income, X are control variables and A is multiplied with the control variables to create interaction terms. 13 Table 9 shows that none of the coefficients on the attrition dummy are significant in the full sample or in either sub-sample, regardless of the inclusion of control variables. This suggests that attrition is not significant in determining either agricultural production or earned income. Nevertheless, an F-test of the joint significance of the coefficient on the attrition dummy and the coefficients on the control variables interacted with the attrition dummy shows that these variables are jointly significant, for agricultural production in the full sample and earned income in both sub-samples. In this way, we conclude that the coefficients on the explanatory variables differ between individuals who disappear from the panel and those who do not. This result indicates that there was nonrandom attrition and thus the use of attrition weights is warranted.
The final test to assess whether attrition was random were a series of probit regressions with the dependent variable equal to one if the enrolled member left the sample between the baseline and follow-up period, and zero otherwise. At the ten percent level of significance and when not conditioning on observed covariates, the weaker pipeline non-beneficiaries in terms of agricultural production appear to have an increased probability of attrition (Table 10 ). For the beneficiary group, when including control variables, it appears that the stronger beneficiaries with respect to agricultural production have an increased probability of attrition (again, only at the ten percent level of significance).
If the lower-than-average producers leave the pipeline non-beneficiary sample, the pipeline nonbeneficiary group appears to be stronger than it actually is, and the reverse is true for the beneficiary group. A stronger pipeline non-beneficiary group coupled with a weaker beneficiary group would lead to a downward bias on the estimated impact of the program. In order for the balanced panel to produce unbiased estimates, the use of attrition weights is required. Due to the particular pattern of attrition described above, it is likely that the use of attrition weights will increase the estimated impact of the program.
The attrition weights, or the inverse probabilities of retention, are estimated using baseline-level data only and defined by:
where Pr(A=0) is the probability of retention, x are the control variables used in the estimation and z are auxiliary variables that affect the attrition propensity, can be related to the density of the outcome variables conditional on the control variables, and yet are not in the original regressions (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) . Two variables were used as the auxiliary variablesprevious ties with association members and whether the enrolled member had lived in a different city in the past ten years. Previous ties with the association members equals one if the enrolled member was friends with, or related to, members of the association before the association formed. This variable is highly predictive of retention among pipeline non-beneficiaries and significant at the ten percent level in the full sample (Appendix Table A2 ). Whether the enrolled member lived in a different city in the past ten years is predictive of retention in the full and beneficiary samples, but only when additional controls are not included (Appendix Table A2 ).
The intuition behind the attrition weights is that they give more weight to enrolled members that have similar initial characteristics to attritors than to enrolled members with characteristics that make them more likely to remain in the sample. Because the nonrandom patterns of attrition were found to be different in the pipeline non-beneficiaries and beneficiary groups, the attrition weights were calculated separately for each group. The weights ranged from 0.54 to 3.2, with a mean of 1.01. With the inclusion of attrition weights, Tables 11 and 12 show that all estimated parameters of the impact of treatment increase in the preferred specifications, but not by a statistically significant amount. This result supports the conclusion that attrition is not the source of the positive and statistically significant findings reported in Section V, and confirms that the patterns observed in attrition were biasing downward-even if only slightlythe estimates of program impact. Worthy of note is that the DD estimate of the impact on earned income of 5-6 years of landownership becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level when attrition weights are used.
Repeated Cross-Section
Rather than use attrition weights, an alternative strategy for testing the robustness of the main results presented in Section V is to make use of all available observations in both crosssections. Thus, the binary and intensity of treatment DD models from equations (1) and (4) can be estimated with the complete baseline data (including attritors) and the complete follow-up data (including replacements). The baseline data contained a total of 1,308 observations-761 individuals that were in the panel plus 547 attritors. Two versions of the follow-up were employed in an effort to differentiate replacements that were likely to be very similar to the original sample from those that could potentially be somewhat different. The first group only includes replacements that belonged to associations that were originally selected to be part of the sample. These are individuals that were present from the beginning, but were not chosen to represent the selected associations. The second group includes all replacements, regardless of when they entered the program. The narrower definition of the repeated cross-section (RCS partial) was estimated with a total of 2,237 observations (929 in the follow-up), while the complete repeated cross-section (RCS full) was estimated with 2,507 observations (1,199 in the follow-up).
14 Table 13 shows the results based on the repeated cross-sectional data. In the case of agricultural production, both the restricted RCS ( Table 4 . The main conclusions for earned income are also the same as in Section V. Both binary RCS estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. Unlike in Table 5 , however, the point estimates are negative. The intensity of treatment coefficients have the same signs as in Table 5 -negative for land ownership through the fourth year, and positive as of the fifth yearand just as in Table 5 all coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Thus, as with the attrition analysis, the repeated cross-section results support the main findings of the paper. The PNCF has a statistically significant impact on agricultural production, and the magnitude of the impact grows with time. Earned income, in contrast, appears to dip in the first few years and then rise thereafter, but neither the decline nor the growth are large enough-or estimated precisely enough-to represent a statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups in the DD model.
15
14 The earned income variable had 6 fewer observations than the agricultural production variable due to outliers. In both cases, when using the complete RCS, 43 observations were included in the binary DD but excluded from the intensity of treatment DD because the date of entry into the program was missing for these beneficiaries. 15 We remind the reader that in the individual fixed effects model the coefficient on earned income was statistically significant for beneficiaries with five or more years of land ownership.
Heterogeneity by Farm Size
In order to investigate heterogeneity among beneficiaries by farm size, a new set of regressions was run. Using the total number of hectares divided by the number of members in a project, the variable "land size per beneficiary" was obtained. This variable was included in levels as a control variable. In addition to land size per beneficiary, a large land size dummy was created using the median number of hectares for all beneficiaries. The indicator variable was equal to one if land size was greater than the median for any particular beneficiary. This indicator variable was then interacted with treatment or with different levels of the number of years of land ownership in the intensity of treatment case.
The results in Table 14 below indicate that PNCF beneficiaries with larger landholdings tend to have a smaller increase in agricultural production than beneficiaries with smaller landholdings. This pattern is observed in the binary and intensity of treatment models.
Nevertheless, the negative coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically significant.
The pattern of larger landholders having slower growth in agricultural production than smaller landholders is consistent with the literature on the inverse relationship between agricultural productivity and farm size (Barrett et al., 2010; Assunção and Braido, 2007) . To be sure, the mean land productivity of PNCF beneficiaries in the lower half of the farm size distribution is almost four times that of beneficiaries in the upper half. With respect to earned income, the opposite pattern is observed. Beneficiaries with larger landholdings appear to have increased earned income as opposed to beneficiaries with smaller landholdings. This reflects the fact that income is a function of both land productivity and farm size, as well as other non-agricultural sources. The difference, however, is once again not statistically significant. As with the robustness tests above, heterogeneity of impacts by farm size does not change any of the main conclusions from Section V.
VII. REPAYMENT
The results in Sections V and VI showed that the PNCF is successful in increasing beneficiaries' agricultural production and earned income after four years of land ownership. It is also important to consider the beneficiaries' ability to repay the PNCF loans, and the net effects of the program after accounting for repayment. A few policies facilitate repayment. First, if the principal is above R$15,000, beneficiaries have up to seventeen years to repay. For smaller loans, the repayment period is limited to fourteen years. Second, the grace period is twenty-four months, and the annual interest rates vary between two and five percent depending on the principal. In the first year of repayment-the beginning of the third year of land ownership-the beneficiaries with a principal of less than R$15,000 are only required to pay the interest accrued on the loan during the first two years (MDA, 2009) . 16 In addition, in the semi-arid regions of the Northeast of Brazil, there is a forty percent discount on all installments made on or before the due date. In the rest of the Northeast, the discount is thirty percent for on-time payments. Lastly, there is an additional ten percent discount on installments for associations that were able to negotiate the price of the land below what the predicted price would have been using the land price monitoring system. The cap for the discounts is R$1,000 per installment. Given these two discounts, it is likely that a high share of beneficiaries should be able to repay their loans. What follows is not an analysis of the percentage of beneficiaries that actually paid. It is an analysis of the percentage that should have had enough income to meet their loan obligations.
As can be seen in The above analysis suggests that there appears to be a relatively high share of beneficiaries who should be able to repay their loans. Nevertheless, the payments range from 25 to 40 percent of beneficiaries' earned income, and considering that these are very poor families these payments might be quite burdensome and substantially decrease their quality of life. In order for the burden of the debt to be minimized, the grace period could be extended so as to give the beneficiaries sufficient time to adapt to their new circumstances and generate enough earned 17 Although including government monetary transfers no longer allows us to strictly measure the ability of beneficiaries to repay given increases in income due to the program, transfers such as old age social security benefits and the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família represent an important share of income in the rural Northeast. Helfand et al. (2009) report that social security transfers accounted for 23 percent of income in the rural Northeast in 2005. In this dataset, the number is slightly higher-at 25 percent.
income to pay the debt with greater ease. In this regard, a more forward looking analysis suggests that-if the program impacts continue to grow at the rate observed in the first six years of land ownership (Table 12 )-beneficiaries should be able to make debt payments more and more easily.
Although the beneficiaries' ability to repay is an important consideration, an equally important question is the effectiveness of the program in improving living standards net of debt payments. While the analysis in Section V and VI showed that the program has a significant impact on agricultural production and earned income, that analysis did not address the repayment of the loan. In order to address this missing piece, the value of the installment due was calculated for each beneficiary and then subtracted from earned income in the follow-up period.
Regressions were re-estimated using the updated earned income, and attrition weights were also used to ensure the representativeness of the sample. Table 16 shows the results for the intensity of treatment estimation including all control variables. The results indicate that once repayment is included in the analysis, beneficiaries no longer enjoy an increase in their current welfare because the gains to earned income are being used for repayment. With both discounts, beneficiaries in the fourth, fifth or sixth year of land ownership now display no significant effects on earned income. Beneficiaries in the fourth year with only one or no repayment discounts, and all beneficiaries with three or less years of land ownership display negative and significant effects of being a beneficiary of the program, once repayment is taken into account. As such, while the program works to increase the earned income of beneficiaries, once repayment is taken into consideration, the beneficiaries in the first four years of the program are statistically worse off in terms of current welfare than the pipeline non-beneficiaries. For beneficiaries with five to six years of land ownership, all of the gains in earned income go towards paying the debt and increasing the net wealth of the household, rather than toward improving current welfare. Since the results become less negative and eventually positive with increasing number of years of land ownership, it is likely that improvements in this situation are only a matter of time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The primary objective of the National Land Credit Program (PNCF) is to promote the creation of productive activities which, in turn, increase the income and wellbeing of the beneficiary population. This impact evaluation confirms that the program achieves the first part of this objective-to create productive activities-through the evidence of increased agricultural production for program beneficiaries. The results for agricultural production are highly significant and robust to alternative specifications, indicating that the program increases agricultural production after the first three years of land ownership. Using the preferred specification of the fixed effects model, we conclude that agricultural production increases by an average of R$750 (US$421) per person in households with five to six years of land ownership.
This represents an increase of 103 percent relative to the baseline production of beneficiaries.
With regard to the welfare of the beneficiary population, earned income is a superior indicator because it accounts for the fact that beneficiaries might increase agricultural production by substituting away from labor market earnings. The analysis of earned income revealed that positive and significant effects only appear for the most seasoned beneficiaries. Relative to the control group, the fixed effects model shows that earned income increased by R$501 (US$281)
per person in households with five to six years of land ownership. This increase of 36 percent relative to the baseline income of beneficiaries indicates that the program also appears to achieve the second part of its primary objective, but exclusively for beneficiaries with more than four years of land ownership. The income gain is roughly equivalent to what a poor household would have received in 2010 through the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família in exchange for ensuring that two children remained in school.
Once repayment of the PNCF loan is factored into the analysis, however, it appears that beneficiaries face a trade-off between current welfare and asset accumulation. The impact of the program net of loan payments becomes negative and significant in the early years, and only becomes positive (but not significant) with five to six years of land ownership. Thus, although the beneficiaries' earned income increased as a result of participation in the program, most of this gain goes to making debt payments for the land. In effect, their current income net of payments was lower or at best the same as income in the control group, but beneficiaries were increasing their net wealth. A more forward looking analysis suggests that-if the program impacts continue to grow at the rate observed in the first five to six years of land ownershipbeneficiaries should be able to make debt payments and improve current welfare simultaneously. This is the cautiously optimistic scenario. The alternative, at least for a share of the beneficiaries, is to fall into arrears on their payments, thereby losing access to the on-time discount and to PRONAF family farm credit.
The results of this study have important implications for policy. First, since beneficiaries only see significant income gains as of the fifth year of land ownership, the grace period should be extended beyond two years to allow sufficient time for productive projects to mature. Second, policy should facilitate improved access to technical assistance and PRONAF loans, which contribute to the success of productive projects and thus to the beneficiaries' repayment capacity.
Third, even with five to six years of land ownership, beneficiaries have not achieved a level of earned income that permits both a higher level of welfare and the ability to repay the loan. This problem could be overcome by spreading debt repayment over a longer horizon in order to reduce the burden of annual payments. Instead of the current 14-17 years, loans could be amortized over 20-30 years. Alternatively, payments of principal could grow more gradually in the initial years of the loan, tracking the expected path of income growth. Fourth, the conclusion that positive effects on income grow with time and become statistically significant as of the fifth year of land ownership underscores the importance of conducting medium term impact evaluations of asset transfer programs, rather than restricting attention to the first few years of program impacts.
The general conclusion, then, is optimistic, but cautious. The PNCF can provide a pathway out of poverty by transferring assets to the poor. There is a positive impact on earned income, which appears to be growing rapidly after the first few years of land ownership. But repayment in the early years is an issue. Beneficiaries require sufficient time on their newly acquired land to realize adequate returns on their investments. It would seem, then, that the PNCF-and asset transfer programs more generally-is a viable option for rural poverty reduction, but positive and significant results are only achieved in a matter of time.
